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ABSTRACT 
 
In 2008, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
released interpretive guidelines regarding antifraud liability for 
statements and disclosures made on company Web sites. The SEC 
noted that a company may incur both criminal and civil liability 
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 for 
hyperlinks to third-party content. However, the Communications 
Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), expressly preempts civil liability for 
interactive computer service providers that post hyperlinks to third-
party content on their Web sites. This Article examines whether 
section 230 immunizes companies from civil liability for hyperlinks to 
third-party content despite the SEC’s interpretive guidelines imposing 
antifraud liability. This Article concludes that companies would likely 
be considered information content providers under section 230 and 
therefore outside the scope of the safe harbor provision for interactive 
computer service providers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In response to rapidly expanding Internet use, the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) has increasingly recognized the 
advantage of having issuers of securities publish company 
communications, statements, and reports on company Web sites.1 SEC 
                                                                                                             
1 See, e.g., Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, 
Exchange Act Release No. 52,056, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,993, 
2005 WL 1692642 (Aug. 3, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 Release]; Use of Electronic 
Media, Securities Act Release No. 7856, Exchange Act Release No. 42,728, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 24,426, 2000 WL 502290 (April 28, 2000) 
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guidelines released since 1995 detail a trend towards not only greater 
acceptance of the Internet as an efficient means for fulfilling disclosure 
requirements of the Securities Act (’33 Act) and the Securities and 
Exchange Act (’34 Act),2 but also increased regulation of company 
disclosures online.3 In the 2008 Commission Guidance on the Use of 
Company Web Sites (Guidelines), the SEC clarified its position of 
imposing liability for communications, statements, and reports 
published on company Web sites.4 To protect investors from 
misleading hyperlinked content on company Web sites, section 10(b) 
of the ’34 Act and Rule 10b-55 impose civil liability for hyperlinked 
third-party content containing a material misstatement or omission 
that is attributable to the company.6 
                                                                                                             
[hereinafter 2000 Release]; Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Securities 
Act Release No. 7233, Exchange Act Release No. 36,345, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 21,399, 60 Fed. Reg. 53,458 (Oct. 13, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Release].  
2 For instance, issuers are now encouraged to make prospectuses (2005 Release), 
annual reports (2000 Release), proxy materials (2000 Release), and Regulation FD 
disclosures (2008 Release) available online.  
3 For example, when a company is in registration, communication on the 
company’s Web site—including hyperlinked information—that meets the definition of 
an “offer to sell,” “offer for sale” or “offer” under section 2(a)(3) of the ’33 Act is 
subject to liability under section 5 of the ’33 Act. 2000 Release, supra note 1. In the 
2000 Release the SEC requested comment on whether a company may be liable for 
communications made by or on behalf of a company on electronic forums, including 
blogs. In 2008, liability for communications was expanded to communications on 
electronic forums. Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites, 
Exchange Act Release No. 58,288, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,351, 
2008 WL 4068202, (Aug. 7, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/ 
2008/34-58288.pdf.  
4 Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites, Exchange Act 
Release No. 58,288, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,351, 2008 WL 
4068202 (Aug. 7, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Release], available at http://www.sec. 
gov/rules/interp/2008/34-58288.pdf.  
5 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/ 
15/usc_sec_15_00000078---j000-.html; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, available at http:// 
www.law.uc.edu/CCL/34ActRls/rule10b-5.html. 
6 2008 Release, supra note 4. While this Article discusses liability for hyperlinks 
under section 10(b) of the ’34 Act, a company may also be liable under provisions of 
the ’33 Act and the ’34 Act for hyperlinks to third-party content, such as section 
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Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act provides a safe 
harbor for interactive computer service providers by preempting 
liability for publishing third-party content.7 If section 230 preempts 
antifraud liability under the ’34 Act, a company would be immunized 
from civil liability.8 However, a company’s antifraud liability for 
hyperlinks to third-party content under the ’34 Act appears to be 
outside the scope of the section 230 safe harbor for interactive 
computer service providers. This Article examines (1) the nature of the 
SEC’s Guidelines regarding liability for hyperlinks to third-party 
information under the Securities and Exchange Act and (2) whether 
section 230 can immunize a company from antifraud liability described 
in the Guidelines for hyperlinks to third-party content. 
 
I. SEC GUIDELINES IMPOSE LIABILITY ON COMPANIES HYPERLINKING 
TO THIRD-PARTY CONTENT TO PROTECT INVESTORS 
 
According to the SEC’s interpretive releases on the use of company 
Web sites, companies are responsible for statements that may 
“reasonably be expected to reach investors or the securities markets 
                                                                                                             
17(a) of the ’33 Act for fraudulent sales or offers to sell securities.  
7 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006), available at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/47/ 
230.html.  
8 See Eric Goldman, SEC’s Proposed Guidance on Hyperlinking Contravenes 47 USC 
230, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG, Nov. 05, 2008, http://blog. 
ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/11/secs_proposed_g.htm (arguing “§ 230 preempts 
all civil causes of action based on third party online content – even causes of action 
enforced by the SEC.”); Eric Goldman, SEC Proposes that Companies Should Be Liable 
for Content Linked From the Company’s Web site, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW 
BLOG, Aug. 28, 2008, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/08/sec_ 
proposes_th.htm (noting section 230 may provide a defense against fraudulent 
marketing under the ‘34 Act); Eric Goldman, Do the FTC’s New 
Endorsement/Testimonial Rules Violate 47 USC 230?, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING 
LAW BLOG, Oct. 06, 2009, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/10/ 
do_the_ftcs_new.htm (analogizing prior arguments made against the SEC to the 
Federal Trade Commission’s imposition of liability for advertisers linking to 
misleading endorsements under the Federal Trade Commission guidelines codified 
in 16 C.F.R. § 255).  
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regardless of the medium through which the statements are made, 
including the Internet.”9 Because of the widespread use of the Internet 
amongst investors, any online content attributed to a company can 
reasonably be expected to reach investors. Liability not only extends to 
communications made by or on behalf of a company on Web sites, 
blogs, or forums, but may also extend to hyperlinked content of third 
parties, such as reports made by financial analysts embedded on a 
company Web site that can be attributed to that company.10 A private 
cause of action may be brought against a company for hyperlinked 
content under section 10(b) of the ’34 Act and Rule 10b-5 when the 
hyperlinked content can be attributed to the company and the 
hyperlink creates a material misstatement or omission in connection 
with the sale or purchase of the company’s securities.11  
The SEC considers hyperlinked content embedded on a company’s 
Web site attributable to that company when the company has either 
entangled itself in the preparation of the information or adopted the 
information.12 Under the entanglement theory, third-party content is 
attributable to a company when the company was involved in the 
preparation of the information.13 For instance, a company may be 
                                                                                                             
9 2000 Release, supra note 1, § (II)(B); see also 2008 Release, supra note 5.  
10 2008 Release, supra note 4, §§ II(B)(2),(4). See generally Robert A. Prentice, 
Vernon J. Richardson, & Susan Scholz, Corporate Web Site Disclosure and Rule 10B-5: 
An Empirical Evaluation, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 531 (1999) (examining the various 
mechanisms by which a company can be held liable under Rule 10b-5).  
11 2008 Release, supra note 4; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006), available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/15/usc_sec_15_00000078---j000-.html; 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, available at http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/34ActRls/rule10b-
5.html. 
12 2000 Release, supra note 1, § II(B)(1). 
13 Id. See also In re Presstek, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 997, 66 SEC Docket 
328, § III(C)(3)(a) (Dec. 22, 1997) (holding issuers liable for false statements by 
others made in a research report if the issuer has “sufficiently entangled itself” with 
the content. (quoting Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 
1980))). In re Presstek indicates that proof of an issuers involvement in the preparation 
is necessary, but notes Eisenstadt v. Allen, 113 F.3d 1240, 1997 WL 211313 (9th Cir. 
1997) (unpublished table decision), leaving the door open for post-preparation 
involvement to be sufficient to attribute content to the issuer. Id.  
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entangled if its activity suggests an implied representation that the 
third-party content was reviewed and is in accordance with the 
company’s views.14  
Under the adoption theory, the content is attributable to the 
company if the company either “explicitly or implicitly endorsed or 
approved the information” regardless of whether the company was 
involved in the preparation of the content.15 A company is presumed 
to have implicitly adopted information when it includes a hyperlink 
within a report that must be filed pursuant to federal securities laws.16 
However, when hyperlinks are used, for example, on a company Web 
site, the circumstances surrounding the use of the hyperlinks must be 
considered to determine whether the hyperlinked content should be 
implicitly attributed to a company.17 In general, providing a link to 
third-party content indicates a company’s belief that “the information 
on the third-party website may be of interest to the users of its 
website.”18 
To avoid the attribution of hyperlinked content, a company may 
use disclaimers, intermediary screens explaining why the link was 
provided, or exit notices between the company’s Web site and the 
third-party’s Web site.19 However, no single tactic immunizes a com-
pany from attribution of content under the adoption theory.20 Ulti-
mately, adoption of content is determined by examining whether there 
                                                                                                             
14 Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 1980). 
15 2000 Release, supra note 1, § II(B)(1). 
16 Id. 
17 2008 Release, supra note 4, § II(B)(2) (for instance, the SEC notes that a 
company’s statements about the hyperlink, the risk of confusion for investors, 
precautions taken to warn investors, and the presentation of the hyperlinked 
information on the Web site should inform a company as to whether a hyperlink will 
be attributable).  
18 Id.  
19 Id. See also Mason Miller, Technoliability: Corporate Websites, Hyperlinks, and Rule 
10(b)-5, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 367, 395 (2001) (discussing use of disclaimers 
accompanying hyperlinks to fall within the safe harbor for forward-looking 
statements codified in the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act). 
20 Id. Of note, waivers of liability under the ’34 Act are ineffective. 15 USC § 
78cc (2006). 
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is a reasonable inference that the company endorsed or approved the 
content.21 
 
II. SAFE HARBOR UNDER SECTION 230 DOES NOT IMMUNIZE 
COMPANIES FROM LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 10(B) OF THE ’34 ACT 
AND RULE 10B-5 
 
Section 230(c) of the Communication Decency Act (CDA) is 
generally understood to immunize interactive computer service pro-
viders (service providers) from civil liability for state and federal claims 
regarding third-party content published on their Web site.22 It has been 
suggested that section 230 may immunize a company that violated 
section 10(b) of the ’34 Act and Rule 10b-5 by hyperlinking from the 
company Web site to third-party content.23 However, section 230 
cannot preempt antifraud liability under section 10(b) of the ’34 Act 
and Rule 10b-5 when the section 230 safe harbor can be harmonized 
with the SEC’s imposition of liability under the Guidelines and there 
is no conflict between the two rules.24 Because companies that have 
                                                                                                             
21 Id. 
22 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006), available at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/ 
47/230.html. A service provider can be immunized from a variety of claims under 
the section 230 safe harbor. See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 
2008) (stating that “courts have construed the immunity provisions in section 230 
broadly in all cases arising from the publication of user-generated content.”); 
Jonathan Band & Matthew Schruers, Safe Harbors Against the Liability Hurricane: The 
Communications Decency Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 20 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 295, 297-98 (2002) (describing the broad application of the section 
230 safe harbor to various state law claims ranging from negligence to infliction of 
emotional distress).  
23 See, e.g., Eric Goldman, SEC’s Proposed Guidance on Hyperlinking Contravenes 47 
USC 230, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG, Nov. 05, 2008 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/11/secs_proposed_g.htm. Goldman 
suggests that section 230 preempts antifraud liability. However, if section 230 and 
the imposition of liability under section 10(b) of the ‘34 Act and Rule 10b-5 are not 
in conflict because antifraud liability for a company is outside the scope of the 
section 230 safe harbor, section 230 cannot preempt antifraud liability.  
24 The canon of harmonization requires a court to reconcile conflicting statutes 
where possible so that each is effective in its purpose. See Timothy K. Armstrong, 
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adopted third-party content, or participated in its preparation, appear 
to be outside the intended, apparent, and judicially interpreted scope 
of section 230 safe harbor for service providers, the rules are not in 
conflict and section 230 cannot be used as an affirmative defense to a 
section 10(b) of the ’34 Act and Rule 10b-5 violation. 
 
A.  The Congressional Intent of Section 230 Indicates that Company 
Liability Under the ’34 Act is Outside the Scope of Safe Harbor 
 
The CDA was promulgated to prevent exposure of objectionable 
and indecent materials to minors.25 Congress recognized that while 
service providers may be able to limit the quantity of objectionable and 
indecent materials online, the service providers could not possibly 
regulate all materials posted by third parties. Because Congress feared 
the threat of tort liability would decrease incentives for service 
providers to continue contributing to the growth of the Internet,26 
section 230 was added to immunize service providers who blocked or 
screened objectionable material27 by providing that service providers 
shall not be held liable on account of self-regulatory activity and “shall 
not be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided 
                                                                                                             
Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, FN 341 
(2004) (describing the role of the judiciary to harmonize apparently conflicting 
statutes when possible). But see Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate 
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. 
REV. 395, 401-06 (1950) (noting that there are number of applicable canons, many of 
which may be paradoxically applied, and their ultimate usefulness is heavily 
influenced by the desired outcome).  
25 See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, Title V § 
230 (1996).  
26 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 
S. Ct. 2341 (1998). See also 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (affirming “It is the policy of the 
United States . . . to promote the continued development of the Internet and other 
interactive computer services and other interactive media . . .”).  
27 H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (where the House of Representatives 
amendment, later codified as section 230, is intended to “protect[ ] from civil liability 
those providers and users of interactive computer services for actions to restrict or to 
enable restriction of access to objectionable online material.”).  
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by another information content provider.”28 
By enacting section 230, Congress specifically intended to overrule 
decisions such as Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services, which imposed 
liability on service providers for third-party content.29 In Stratton, 
Prodigy Services was a service provider of an online bulletin holding 
itself out to the public as controlling the content of messages posted by 
third parties.30 When the service provider did not either edit or remove 
unlawful content, the service provider was found liable as a publisher 
of unlawful third-party content despite the service provider’s 
arguments that it was impossible to patrol all of the content posted to 
the bulletin.31 Section 230 specifically overturned Stratton by 
precluding the imposition of publisher liability on a service provider 
for editing or regulating third-party content.  
The legislative record does not indicate blanket immunity for all 
service providers under section 230. Rather, section 230 safe harbor 
appears to be restricted to those service providers, such as Prodigy 
Services, that are not claiming the content as their own but rather are 
acting merely as conduits or editors of material posted by third parties. 
Companies liable under the ’34 Act for hyperlinks to third-party 
content are more than mere service providers, such as Prodigy Services, 
that may or may not edit third-party content. Such companies 
deliberately place hyperlinks to third-party content because they have 
determined that the information is useful and intend Web site visitors 
to read and consider the content. Companies that post content to 
further a Web site visitor’s understanding of the company are readily 
distinguishable from companies, such as Prodigy Services, offering a 
forum by which third parties can choose to post their own content. As 
such, a company liable under the ’34 Act appears to be outside the in-
tended scope of the section 230 safe harbor.  
                                                                                                             
28 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).  
29 H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (citing Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. 
Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (unpublished opinion)).  
30 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1995) (unpublished opinion).  
31 Id.  
9
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Further, the SEC’s goal of protecting investors from being misled 
in the securities market by holding companies liable for hyperlinked 
information is consistent with Congress’s intent that section 230 only 
provide safe harbor for service providers acting as mere conduits of 
third-party content on the Internet. Precluding companies from 
invoking the section 230 safe harbor for conduct impermissible under 
the ’34 Act would not have the detrimental effect on the growth of the 
Internet Congress sought to avoid. In fact, the SEC anticipates 
increasing use of the Internet by companies seeking to communicate 
with investors.32 
 
B.  The Plain Meaning of Section 230 Indicates that Companies Liable 
Under the ’34 Act are Outside the Scope of Safe Harbor 
 
The plain meaning of section 230(c) broadly grants federal im-
munity against all civil causes of action.33 The only significant limita-
tion to section 230(c) is that safe harbor only applies to service pro-
viders, not information content providers (content providers).34 A 
service provider is “any information service, system, or access software 
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to 
a computer server, including specifically a service or system that 
provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services 
offered by libraries or educational institutions.”35 By contrast, a 
content provider is “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole 
or in part, for the creation or development of information provided 
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”36 
While service providers act as a conduit for posting information, 
content providers have played some role in creating or developing the 
information posted online. Because section 230(c)(1) immunizes only 
                                                                                                             
32 See supra note 7.  
33 § 230(e). See also, Band & Schruers, supra note 22.  
34 § 230(c)(1) (stating, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”).  
35 § 230(f)(2).  
36 § 230(f)(3). 
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service providers, any content provider that contributed to the 
objectionable content remains subject to civil liability for content 
posted online.37  
A company that maintains a company Web site is likely a content 
provider and not a service provider in situations where antifraud 
liability under the ’34 Act is at issue. The SEC requires that third-party 
content be attributable to a company for the company to incur liability 
under the ’34 Act. Under the entanglement theory, information is 
attributed to a company if the company was responsible for the 
preparation of the information.38 Content providers meet the 
attribution definition under entanglement theory because they are 
responsible for the preparation of information or have participated, in 
whole or in part, in the “creation or development” of the information. 
Therefore, demonstration that a company is entangled with the 
hyperlinked information may also demonstrate that a company is a 
content provider and outside the bounds of safe harbor protection 
under section 230. 
 
C.  The Judicial Interpretation of Section 230 Indicates that Companies 
Liable Under the ’34 Act are Outside the Scope of Safe Harbor 
 
Courts are generally cautious about extending the scope of safe 
harbor under section 230 and will often try to balance the seemingly 
narrow congressional intent of section 230 against the apparently 
broad grant of immunity in section 230(c)(1).39 Ultimately, the scope 
of section 230 is determined by whether the provider is considered a 
                                                                                                             
37 See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com. Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(where soliciting data through an online questionnaire did not constitute “a 
significant role in creating, developing or ‘transforming’ the relevant information” 
and therefore the online dating service was not an internet content provider under 
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3)).  
38 See supra note 13.  
39 See Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122-23 (refusing to expand section 230 so broadly 
as to create an advantage for online businesses over businesses operating in the “real 
world”); Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, 
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008).  
11
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service provider or content provider.40 The clearest example of service 
providers with immunity under the section 230 safe harbor are 
generally Web sites, like eBay, Google and AOL, that publish content 
volunteered by third parties.41 The mantra appears to be that a passive 
provider is a safe provider. However, the distinction between a service 
provider that merely publishes another’s content and a content 
provider that creates and develops content is not clear, especially when 
a provider can operate within both spheres.42 To resolve the 
distinction, courts have largely relied on the extent of the contribution 
to the creation or development of the content and the extent to which 
the provider is the “publisher or speaker” of the content. 
 
1. Contribution to the Creation or Development of Content 
 
When a provider is merely a conduit for information and provides 
no editorial contribution—similar to a telephone company relaying 
signals between two customers—safe harbor under section 230 is 
permissible.43 For example, in Zeran v. America Online the Fourth 
                                                                                                             
40 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (establishing 
that section 230 immunity depends on whether the provider is an interactive 
computer service provider and not an information content provider).  
41 See Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 714-15 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
2002) (provider of online marketplace is an internet service provider); Parker v. 
Google, 422 F.Supp.2d 492, 500-01 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (stating “there is no doubt that 
Google qualifies as an ‘interactive computer service’” eligible for immunity under 
section 230); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 
(10th Cir. 2000) (provider of e-mail service is an interactive computer service 
provider).  
42
 See, e.g., Mazur v. eBay, No. 07-03967, 2008 WL 618988 (N.D. Cal. July 
23, 2008), available at http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7015046710981
364619&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr (defining eBay as an interactive 
computer service provider with immunity under section 230 when eBay failed to 
withdraw third-party content it knew to be illegal, but noting that eBay can function 
as both an interactive computer service provider as well as an information content 
provider). 
43 See Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 986 (holding America Online immune from liability 
for publishing inaccurate stock information by third parties because the contract 
between America Online and the third parties provided that AOL “may not modify, 
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Circuit held America Online not liable for inappropriate content 
posted to its message board by a third party when America Online 
merely provided the message board service and was not involved in 
either creating the content or encouraging third parties to post such 
content.44  
However, a provider who makes a material editorial contribution, 
beyond merely transmitting a third party’s content or making minor 
edits, will be considered to have participated in the “creation or 
development” of content under section 230 and will not be eligible for 
safe harbor.45 In Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, a roommate-
matching Web site was considered a content provider, unable to claim 
section 230 immunity, because it was considered the developer of 
infringing content when it created a questionnaire and required users 
to answer questions that violated the Fair Housing Act.46 Even though 
the Roommates.com users ultimately made the selections using a drop-
down menu in the questionnaire, Roommates.com was liable as a 
content provider because it created a questionnaire where the users 
had no choice but to violate the Fair Housing Act.47 The court 
determined that “development” is defined as “making usable or 
                                                                                                             
revise, or change” the information it received from the third parties. America Online 
was therefore contractually prohibited from being a content provider); Universal 
Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, 478 F.3 d 413, 420 (1st Cir. 2007) (determining that a 
message board operator is protected under section 230 for postings by third parties, 
even when the message board operator knew that the content was illegal, when the 
message board operation was not involved in the creation or development of the 
content). 
44
 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.  
45 See Hy Cite Corp. v. badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, 418 F.Supp.2d 1142, 
1149 (D. Ariz. 2005) (denying CDA immunity to a provider that contributes content 
and solicits third-party content for a newsletter even though the provider did not 
contribute to the creation of the newsletter’s unlawful content); Blumenthal v. 
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding a publishing of a gossip column 
immune from liability as a service provider, but indicated that section 230 would not 
immunize the creator of the gossip column because such a creator is an information 
content provider).  
46 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 
F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).  
47 Id. at 1172. 
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available” or “the process of researching, writing, gathering, organizing 
and editing information for publication on web sites.”48 If 
Roommates.com had merely created an open-ended questionnaire, 
where users had a choice whether or not to provide infringing content, 
section 230 safe harbor may have been appropriate because 
Roommates.com would not have contributed to the “development” of 
the infringing content by either writing, gathering, organizing or 
editing the user provided information.49 While a service provider may 
offer traditional editorial input without such input being considered a 
contribution to the creation or development of content,50 a provider 
that induces the unlawful content or impermissibly selects content for 
publication will be considered a content provider and outside the 
scope of the section 230 safe harbor.51  
                                                                                                             
48 Id. at 1168 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY for 
the definition of “develop” and WIKIPEDIA for the definition of “web content 
development”). 
49 See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com. Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(soliciting data from an open-ended questionnaire where users filled in blank space 
did not constitute “a significant role in creating, developing or ‘transforming’ the 
relevant information” because the users had a choice whether to provide infringing 
content and, therefore, the online dating service was not a content provider. In 
contrast to Roommates.com, the court considered the answers unlawful, not the 
questionnaire). 
50
 Mazur v. eBay, No. 07-03967, 2008 WL 618988 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2008) 
(deciding whether to publish is a traditional editorial function that is acceptable for 
an internet service provider seeking safe harbor under section 230). See also Batzel v. 
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (determining that a defendant was not an 
information content provider of an e-mail when he made minor alterations to a 
tortious e-mail provided by a third party to include in a newsletter); Doe v. 
Friendfinder Network, Inc, 540 F.Supp.2d 288 (D.N.H. 2008) (finding that a 
provider who re-posted a profile on a social networking site with “slight” 
modifications that did not contribute to the injurious character of the posting was 
immune from state law causes of action). 
51 Fair Hous. Council, 521 F.3d at 1166-69 (a service provider cannot claim safe 
harbor if it “contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct,” such as 
when it requests users to supply discriminatory criteria or uses the unlawful criteria 
to limit information that users can access). Compare NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., No. 
06-4874-BLS1, 2009 WL 995483 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2009) (citing Fair 
Housing Council to bar StubHub from claiming section 230 immunity when it 
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Under current jurisprudence, a court would likely characterize a 
company, liable under the ’34 Act for hyperlinking to third party 
content, as a content provider. In particular, posting hyperlinks is an 
editorial function and clearly “creation or development.”52 The 
judiciary has refused to immunize service providers that have either 
contributed more than traditional edits to the content53 or contributed 
materially to the development of the third-party content.54 Under the 
entanglement theory of attribution, an issuer can only be liable under 
the securities laws when the issuer has so involved itself in the 
preparation of the information that the content can be attributed to 
the issuer.55 Such preparation involves more than mere editing or 
providing a conduit by which third parties may pass along information. 
Rather, in order for information to be attributed to a company, the 
company must have aided in the development or creation of the 
content; by implication, this content is deemed to represent the 
company’s views.  
Like in Fair Housing Council, a company liable under the ’34 Act for 
fraudulent hyperlinks is more than a “passive transmitter” when it 
contributes, at least in part, to the development of infringing content 
by researching, gathering, and making the third-party content available 
on its Web site. Because the entanglement theory has substantial 
requirements for the content to be attributed to a company, a 
company that is found liable under section 10(b) of the ’34 Act and 
Rule 10b-5 may also be considered a content provider and, therefore, 
ineligible for the section 230 safe harbor. 
 
                                                                                                             
“materially contributed to the illegal ‘ticket scalping’ of its sellers” by allowing ticket 
scalpers to resale tickets in a way that blocked the identify of the resellers and 
purchasers), with Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. 
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that Craigslist was 
immune as a service provider because Craigslist did not “induce[] anyone to post any 
particular listing or express a preference for discrimination.”).  
52 See supra text accompanying note 45. 
53 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).  
54 Fair Hous. Council, 521 F.3d at 1167-68.  
55 See supra text accompanying note 13. 
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2. Provider as Publisher or Speaker of Content 
 
In addition to considering the extent of editorial contribution, 
courts have also weighed the extent to which a provider is said to be a 
publisher or speaker of third-party content when distinguishing a 
content provider from a service provider.56 In Anthony v. Yahoo!, Yahoo 
sent profiles of former subscribers of its dating service to current 
subscribers in order to mislead and induce current subscribers to 
continue subscribing.57 While the profiles were created by third parties, 
Yahoo was considered a “publisher or speaker” of the profiles when it 
intentionally misrepresented the profiles to current subscribers of the 
dating service.58 Because Yahoo was considered the “publisher or 
speaker” of the misrepresented profiles, Yahoo was considered a 
content provider and was barred from using the section 230 safe 
harbor as a defense for its tortious actions.59  
A company found liable for violating the ’34 Act would likely be 
considered a content provider and outside the scope of the section 230 
safe harbor pursuant to the holding in Anthony. Just as Yahoo was 
considered a content provider when it used former-subscriber profiles 
to perpetrate a fraud or misrepresentation, a company liable under the 
’34 Act would be a content provider when the company uses 
hyperlinks to misrepresent material information to investors.60 Under 
the adoption theory, attribution is presumed when a company 
                                                                                                             
56 Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Batzel v. 
Smith, 333 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that if the “information is provided to 
those individuals in a capacity unrelated to their function as a provider or user of 
interactive computer services, then there is no reason to protect them with special 
statutory immunity.”). 
57 Anthony, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 1259-60. 
58 Id. at 1263. The court also considered Yahoo an information content provider 
when it created false profiles to send to subscribers because Yahoo was entirely 
responsible for the creation or development of such content.  
59 Id. 
60 Of note, in both situations, the profiles used by Yahoo or the third-party 
information used by a company are not themselves unlawful, it is the use of the 
content by Yahoo or a company that is impermissible.  
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intentionally hyperlinks to third-party content unless the circumstances 
surrounding the use of the hyperlink, such as the presence of a 
disclaimer, would lead a reasonable investor to understand that the 
company has not adopted the hyperlinked content.61 Therefore, a 
company that implicitly adopts third-party content may also be 
considered a content provider under section 230 because the company 
is necessarily using third-party content to misrepresent information to 
investors and perpetrate a fraud under the ’34 Act.  
Regardless of whether content is attributable to a company under 
the entanglement theory or the adoption theory, a company liable 
under the ’34 Act for hyperlinking to fraudulent third-party content 
will likely be considered a content provider because the company is (1) 
aiding in the creation or development of the content, as distinguished 
from providing minor editorial contributions like in Zeran; (2) 
contributing to the development of the infringing content by 
researching, gathering, and making available infringing third-party 
content on its Web site like in Fair Housing Council; or (3) using the 
third-party content to perpetrate a fraud or misrepresentation like in 
Anthony. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Because the SEC’s Guidelines indicate that company liability 
under section 10(b) of the ’34 Act and Rule 10b-5 for hyperlinked 
third-party content require the hyperlinked content be attributable to a 
company, a company would likely be considered an information 
content provider under section 230 and outside the scope of the 
section 230 safe harbor for interactive computer service providers. As 
such, section 230 safe harbor may not immunize a company from a 
section 10(b) of the ’34 Act and Rule 10b-5 violation. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
61 See supra text accompanying note 13. 
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PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 To avoid the possibility of liability, companies that post statements, 
disclosures, and reports on their Web sites should protect 
themselves as if they could be held liable under section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 for embedded hyperlinks to 
fraudulent third-party content. 
 A company that embeds hyperlinks to third-party content on its 
Web site may avoid antifraud liability by using disclaimers, in-
termediary screens, exit notices between the issuer’s Web site and 
the third party’s Web site, or explanations of why the links were 
provided to ensure that the content is not attributed to the 
company.  
 Because 47 U.S.C. § 230 can be harmonized with the SEC’s 
Guidelines on antifraud liability for information on company Web 
sites, section 230 safe harbor is likely a poor defense against private 
causes of action for fraudulent misstatements or omissions 
involved in the sale or purchase of securities under section 10(b) of 
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. 
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